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enormously more difficult, if not impossible. But the "Principia" has a logical rigor not previously attained, and the authors can hardly be said to have "followed" earlier treatises save in the most general way.

Although there is much that is novel in result, still the chief value of the work is its method. Proofs are ordinarily abbreviated or merely indicated, in Volume II., but they can readily be reconstructed, and when so reconstructed are identical in character with those of the "mathematical logic" of Part I. The ordinary "operations of thought" are banished. Mathematical operations are reduced to relations. The only operations used in producing proof are substitution and assertion. Expressions which are equivalent, by definition or proof, are substituted for one another, and values of variables (or expressions which may be regarded as values) are substituted for variables. If by such substitution (in a proposition already assumed or proved) there results an expression of the form " a, b, c implies x, y, z " and " a, b, c " is a previous proposition, " x, y, z " is now asserted as a new lemma or theorem. Adherence to this method is the demonstration of the assertion, first made by Mr. Russell in "Principles of Mathematics," that mathematics may be developed strictly from the fundamental logical relations.

In attempting any thorough study of the volume or of any portion, the reader will do well to familiarize himself with the operation of this method and, by reading the summaries which precede each section, to get the exact meaning of new symbols as they are introduced. He may then turn to more detailed study with profit.

The book is bound to be difficult. Explanatory passages are so condensed that they require more concentrated attention than the portion in symbols. Often one turns from the English to the symbols in order to find out exactly what is meant. Those who are inclined to object to the symbolic method of proof should defer criticism until they are able to read the symbols with understanding.

Whatever one's opinion of logistic or of the particular treatment here given to mathematics, one must at least pay his respects to the logical rigor of the method and the splendid persistence with which it is maintained. The "Principia" is to intellect what the pyramids are to manual labor. And the "Principia" has the added wonder that the whole structure is balanced on its apex of logical constants.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. March, 1914. *Hasard et Déterminisme* (pp. 225-265): M. DARBON. — Chance reigns in the part of physical nature which is deprived of all teleological organization; it affects also those conscious beings who do not know how to coordinate their movements in order to attain an end or are hesitating in the choice of ends to pursue: "in both cases, chance appears as a lack of finality" . . . lack of finality meaning a lacuna in the determinism of phenomena. *Valeurs d'Art*

(*L'Esthétique sociologique*) (pp. 266-282): LUCIEN ARRÉAT. — "Society, in whatever mass, proclaims value, assesses it, but does not create value." General approval does not determine art-values, but only discloses the qualities which are necessary to value. "Sociological value and art-value are expressions which do not necessarily cover the same field." *Études expérimentales. L'Image Mentale d'après les Expériences d'Introspection*: A. SPAIER. *L'Étude de l'Image d'après les Travaux de Pavlov*: MARCELLE DONTCHEF-DEZEUZE. *Analyses et Comptes Rendus*. N. Porsenna et Serge Manolesco, *Interdépendance des Facteurs Sociaux*: J. BOURJADE. G. H. Luquet, *Essai d'une Logique Systématique et Simplifiée*: A. LALANDE. *Notices Bibliographiques. Revue des Périodiques*.

MIND. April, 1914. *Are Meanings Inherited?* (pp. 169-179): C. LLOYD MORGAN. — A review and criticism of Mr. Stout's chapter on Instinct in the new edition of his "Manual of Psychology," containing a brief interpretation of instinctive behavior on the assumption that meanings are not inherited, thus opposing the contrary view of Mr. Stout. *Psychic Function and Psychic Structure* (pp. 180-193): HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. — It is the current view that further advance in psychology is to be expected from functional and behavioristic rather than from structural and introspective methods. Facts are adduced to show that structural psychology is of prime importance in the solution of the fundamental problems of consciousness and of the psychical. *Some Problems of Philosophy* (pp. 194-206): F. MELIAN STAWELL. — A criticism of Mr. Russell's "Some Problems of Philosophy," questioning Mr. Russell's treatment of physical space, his Berkeleian alliance, perception and knowledge, induction, universals, hypothetical knowledge *à priori*, self-evidence, and arithmetic and the universe. *James, Bergson, and Traditional Metaphysics* (pp. 207-239): HORACE M. KALLEN. — A comparative exposition of the metaphysical views of James and Bergson, concluding that "the main outlines of Bergson's thought are the main outlines of all transcendentalism. The main outlines of James's thought are not prefigured in the history of philosophy." *Discussions: The Calculus of Strict Implication* (pp. 240-247): C. L. LEWIS. *Is Inversion a Valid Inference?* (pp. 248-250): CHARLES MERCIER. *Mr. Russell on Sense-data and Knowledge* (pp. 251-255): J. E. TURNER. *Critical Notes*: C. Mercier, *A New Logic*: E. E. C. JONES. Ch. Renouvier. *Traité de Logique Générale et de Logique Formelle*: C. D. BROAD. W. Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*: H. WILDON CARR. T. B. MULLER, *De Kennisleer van het Anglo-Amerikaansch Pragmatisme*: R. F. A. HOERNLÉ. *New Books, Philosophical Periodicals. Notes and Correspondence*.

Dontchef-Dezeuze, Marcelle. *L'Image et les Reflexes Conditionnels dans les Travaux de Pavlov*. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1914. Pp. xvi + 176. 2 F. 50.

Griffin, E. H.; Dunlap, K.; Lovejoy, A. O. *Three Studies in Current Philosophical Questions*. The Johns Hopkins University Circular, No. 3. Baltimore: University Press. 1914. Pp. 99.

Vorländer, Karl. *Immanuel Kant zum ewigen Frieden*. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1914. Pp. lvi + 74. 2.80M.

Wallas, Graham. *The Great Society*. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. xii + 383. \$2.00.

Wallin, J. E. Wallace. *The Mental Health of the School Child*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1914. Pp. xiii + 463. \$2.00.

NOTES AND NEWS

At the meeting of the Aristotelian Society on July 13, Mr. H. Wildon Carr read a paper on "The Principle of Relativity and its Importance for Philosophy." The principle of relativity has been formulated in physics to account for the negative results of all experiments contrived to detect the acceleration of a movement from observations made within the moving system. It affirms that it is impossible to discover the motion of a system relatively to other systems by means of experiments performed entirely within the system (for instance, the motion of the earth relatively to sun or stars by means of purely terrestrial experiments), and that the velocity of light is a universal constant, independent of the motion of the source. The consequences of this theory are the abolition of ether, the relativity of space and time to the observer's system of reference, the impossibility of conceiving absolute position or absolute simultaneity, and that mass is a function of velocity. There were three problems of philosophy that seemed to be closely bound up with the physical problems raised by relativity. These were (1) the problem of continuity, (2) the nature of real duration, and (3) the problem of original movement. The doctrine that movement or change is original, and things are a derivation from it or views of it, was curiously in accordance with the principle that mass is a function of velocity. A discussion followed the paper, opened by Professor T. P. Nunn, who thought that Dr. Carr had over-emphasized the importance of the principle of relativity for philosophy. It represented a great mathematical advance, threw light on things badly illuminated before, but had not destroyed old views. It had, he agreed, influenced Mr. Russell, but it had not altered his old view of space so much as to make him recognize the equal reality of private space. By private space was not meant psychological space, but the real space to which each individual has access at each of his moments. Mr. Sheldon also thought the importance of the principle of relativity greatly exaggerated, and held that the experiments were explicable in many other ways. All of these were purely scientific, and had no more relation to philosophy than problems of meta-geometry. Dr. Wolf developed the view that the whole argument about relativity had originated in Kant's conception of time and space as modes of apprehension. He thought that the paradoxes were really due to a confusion of two different things, namely, the nature of time and space, and the difficulties of measuring time and space. Miss Constance Jones and Miss Oakeley were among the other speakers.—*Athenæum*.

WE have received the fourth volume of "Die Philosophie der Gegenwart" containing an index and analysis of the philosophical literature for 1912. The work is marked by the same painstaking care, industry, and competence which have been characteristic of the previous volumes.

DR. HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN, instructor in philosophy at Columbia University, has accepted an assistant professorship in philosophy at Leeland Stanford Junior University.